WAR/PEACE REPORT

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

RUSSIAN, AMERICAN SCIENTISTS— On the Brink of War, They Talked Of PEACE . . . . . By Richard Hudson

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THE MARCH OF EVENTS

The Hammarskjold era of the United Nations, as it will surely be remembered, ended with a tragic plane crash in Northern Rhodesia. The next era, whatever it may be, is certain to be radically different.

The lonely Swede steadily sought to build a truly international civil service whose head could take independent action in the interest of world peace. In 1955 he traveled to Peking on a mission that led to the freeing of some American prisoners. When the Suez trouble blew up in 1956, he oversaw U.N. intervention that ended the hostilities. Last year, when a new "nation" was engulfed in racial violence that threatened to become a cockpit for the Cold War, he did not hesitate to ask that the world body attempt to solve the problem. The Congo became Hammarskjold's Waterloo: It cost him the support of the Soviet Union, brought the organization to the brink of bankruptcy and, finally, took his life. The Congo could also be the U.N.'s Waterloo: The situation in the Congo itself remains unsolved; the bills are still unpaid and, worst of all, the Soviet demand for a troika to head the Secretariat, which grew out of the Congo operation, threatens to strangle the whole U.N.

President Kennedy, in his speech before the U.N. on September 25, put the issue eloquently: "A noble servant of peace is gone. But the quest for peace lies before us. The problem is not the death of one man — the problem is the life of this organization. . . . For in the development of this organization rests the only true alternative to war — and war appeals no longer as a rational alternative. Unconditional war can no longer lead to unconditional victory. It can no longer be of concern to great powers alone. For a nuclear disaster, spread by wind and water and fear, could well engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and the uncommitted alike. Mankind must put an end to war — or war will put an end to mankind."

In announcing that the U. S. was presenting a new disarmament plan to the U.N., Kennedy said: "Man may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness — for in a spiraling arms race, a nation's security may be shrinking even as its arms increase. . . . It is therefore our intention to challenge the Soviet Union not to an arms race, but to a peace race — to advance together step by step, stage by stage, until general and complete disarmament has been achieved."

The new U. S. plan contains important departures from the last one, particularly in the first stage. The U. S. position at Geneva last year before the Russians walked out of the talks was that the 10 negotiating nations should sign a treaty for the first stage of a disarmament treaty and begin to carry it out immediately. The Russians charged, with considerable justification, that the first stage was top heavy with inspection and did not reduce significantly the capacity to wage war. The new U. S. plan includes these additions to the first of the three stages:

(1) Nuclear weapons delivery systems would be cut back; their production would be discontinued or limited; their testing would be limited or halted.

(2) The armed forces of the U. S. and the Soviet

Union would be limited to 2.1 million men each (the previous figure had been 2.5 million), and other militarily significant states would reduce their forces to appropriate levels.

(3) Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for arbitration, for the development of international law and for the establishment in Stage II of a permanent U.N. Peace Force.

(4) A commission of experts would be established to examine and report on the feasibility and means of accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

The first stage of the most recent Russan plan (June 2, 1960) contrasts sharply with the U. S. first stage. Within one to one and a half years the Soviets would eliminate all means of delivering nuclear weapons, including airplanes, rockets, ships, submarines and artillery. If carried out, this would entirely change the nature of a potential war. The Russians claim they would permit the control organization complete inspection, although they sometimes balk on certain key details. However, it is not until the third stage of the Russian plan, after disarmament is supposed to be complete, that the Russians make their first mention of "measures for preserving peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." They also suggest in the third stage that "states will undertake, where necessary, to place at the disposal of the Security Council units from the contingents of the police (militia) remaining at their disposal." Thus it appears that the Russians are not yet ready to accept the limitations on their sovereignty that would be necessary for full disarmament to work.

One sign of some encouragement was the joint statement on September 20 of the U. S. and the Soviet Union on principles for disarmament negotiations. Although the two sides could not agree on the composition of the body to negotiate disarmament, they did issue a statement that seemed to bring them nearer together generally, and specifically on at least two important points: (1) that it is necessary to verify all the measures of one stage before moving on to the next stage, and (2) that early measures of disarmament might be undertaken as part of a plan for total disarmament before agreement is reached on the full program.

Another ray of hope in the dark panorama was the passage by heavy majorities in both houses of Congress of the new U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The status of the agency, which is to be "independent" yet under the State Department, is not yet clear. William C. Foster, No. 2 man in the now-dissolving U. S. Disarmament Agency under John J. McCloy, was named head of the new agency. Among other things, the agency is expected to supply what Kennedy referred to in his U.N. speech as a proposal for "a series of steps to improve the United Nations' machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes — for on-the-spot fact-finding, mediation and adjudication — for extending the rule of international law."

The great question is how the Soviet Union will react to the new initiative. In view of the continued Russian testing in the atmosphere and the demands for a troika in the Secretariat, there is little ground for optimism. The immediate problem — still — is the Berlin situation. If a satisfactory accommodation can be reached there, some of the other impasses might begin to open up.

The one certain thing is the stakes that we are playing for in these days. As Kennedy put it before the U.N.: "The events and decisions of the next 10 months may well decide the fate of man for the next 10,000 years. There will be no avoiding those events. There will be no appeal from those decisions. And we shall be remembered either as the generation that turned this planet into a flaming pyre or the generation that met its vow 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.' "

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RUSSIAN, AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

On the Brink of War, They Talked of Peace

By Richard Hudson

Stowe, Vermont

While the Berlin crisis continued unabated and the Soviet Union carried out one nuclear test after another, a group of 48 leading scientists from 11 countries — including 19 Americans and 11 Russians — gathered at a luxurious ski lodge in the Green Mountains of Vermont to spend six days seeking ways to peace through disarmament and world security. The occasion was the Eighth Conference on Science and World Affairs (COSWA).

The beginning could hardly have been less auspicious. On August 13 the Communists sealed off East and West Berlin; on August 31 the Soviet Union announced it would resume nuclear testing; on September 1 it set off its first blast in the atmosphere. On September 5, after two more Russian blasts, the seventh COSWA opened at Stowe, Vermont. Designed as a sort of warmer-upper for the eighth COSWA that would follow on its heels, the seventh had as its theme, "International Cooperation in Pure Science." The crucial eighth COSWA was really to be a sequel to the sixth, which was held last December in Moscow, also on "Disarmament and World Security." The same 11 Russian scientists participated in both the seventh and eighth COSWAs, while the delegations of the U. S. and some of the other countries were changed.

For a while it appeared doubtful that the long planned gatherings would take place at all. "When I heard about the Soviet resumption of testing," one American participant said, "I did not think the Russians would show up at all." As it was, the name of Prof. Peter Kapitza, erratic but brilliant Soviet physicist whom Stalin once put under house arrest for refusal to work on the Soviet atomic bomb, was withdrawn at the last moment.

But once the conference began, with greetings from both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, the scientists began their task with relish. "Getting a group of scientists together to suggest research projects," an English participant said, "is like asking children what they want for Christmas. They'll come up with lots of good ideas. The question is: Where is the money coming from?" Nevertheless, he added that he thought the money would be forthcoming for at least some of the projects.

In its unanimously approved 27-page final report, the seventh COSWA declared: "Our previous conferences have been chiefly concerned with ways of preventing the misuse of science in the wholesale destruction of mankind. In this conference at Stowe, we have turned to the discussion of constructive international cooperation in science, because it is a way to create trust between nations. . . . Science used cooperatively by all nations for the increase of human knowledge and the improvement of man's productive capacity can give all men on earth a satisfactory and worthwhile life."

Indeed, the scientists were not timid. Here are a few of the projects proposed for joint international research and development:

• ***A survey of the entire ocean in three dimensions.*** One outgrowth of this might be an answer to the protein deficiency of two-thirds of the world's population. Man now gets about one per cent of his food requirements from the sea. The scientists estimated that this could be increased tenfold by elevating the fishing industry from a hunting operation to an agricultural technology.

• ***Natural catastrophe research.*** The scientists hope to be able to forecast, minimize and perhaps eventually even control such disasters as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes and tornadoes.

• ***Nuclear physics.*** Since modern physical science has become so expensive, the scientists recommended as an international project a "big particle" accelerator of 300 billion electron volts (10 times larger than the biggest existing atom smasher).

• ***Health.*** Increased international medical research was suggested in such fields as cancer, cardiovascular disease, immunology, infectious diseases, mental health, environmental sanitation, problems of aging, nutrition and genetics. The scientists suggested tripling funds available for health research.

If the questions of Berlin and Russian resumption of nuclear testing were backstage at the seventh COSWA where pure science was the topic, they were spotlighted from beginning to end at the eighth, on disarmament and world security. The Russians did not want to talk about testing at all, and when they did they only echoed Khrushchev's line that resumption of testing was necessary because of the threatening attitude of the U. S. Most U. S. scientists were badly shaken by the resumption and totally unsatisfied with the Russian explanations. Nevertheless, discussions were carried on with due regard to amenities, and one scientist noted that at no time were disagreements so obviously bitter as they had been at times during a recent all-American gathering, the

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Mr. Hudson, editor of War/Peace Report, *was previously managing editor of* The Daily Journal *in Caracas, Venezuela, and has written widely on international affairs from Europe and Latin America. He was one of the small press corps covering the eighth COSWA.*

Seventh National Conference on World Disarmament and Development, held in Washington, D.C., last April. At that meeting, attended by representatives of 43 national organizations, there were some sharp exchanges between the so-called "disarmers" and "arms controllers."

"The people we encountered in Moscow in November and December of last year were serious about wanting disarmament," said M.I.T.'s Donald G. Brennan. "They said a nuclear test ban treaty was the most important thing in the world, that the question of three versus 20 inspections per year was negotiable. We left there highly encouraged, almost certain the test ban treaty would go through. Yet now we have learned that at that very time the Soviet government must have been preparing the instrumentation to carry out a new series of tests, for these tests require a long lead time. I am sure the people we were talking to were not informed of these plans. Of course, the actual decision to resume testing was not irrevocable until August 31."

The Moscow conference is believed to have had a strong influence on the Kennedy administration's decision to push hard to get a test ban treaty as a first step toward disarmament. Both Jerome B. Wiesner, now President Kennedy's science adviser, and Walt W. Rostow, now Kennedy's deputy special assistant for national security affairs, were participants there. Because of their official capacities, they did not attend the Stowe meetings but they have been fully informed of the proceedings by their close associates who were there. Many of the American participants at the conferences were previously on President Eisenhower's Science Advisory Committee and are now on that same body for President Kennedy.

It is difficult to say how much weight these Russian scientists have with the Soviet government. The delegation was headed by A. V. Topchiev, first vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and included three other members of the Academy's ruling presidium. From outside the pure sciences, the Russian group included a historian, an economist and the head of the Foreign Department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Brennan had this to say of the Russian delegation: "Topchiev, the Russian leader, is certainly close to his government. But some of the others, we can tell from dealing with them, are not approaching the problems with firsthand knowledge. I can imagine that when some of these people return to Russia, they will go back to their institutes doing work quite distant from the problems we are discussing here. The Soviets have people in the Academy who are better versed in arms control and disarmament matters than some of those present here but they were probably not sent for reasons of being too low in the hierarchy."

Leo Szilard, who was as unimpressed as his colleagues with the reasons given by the Russians for the resumption of nuclear testing, told COSWA participants the Russians' explanation reminded him of this story:

A Texas banker was asked to finance an expensive mining project. After thinking about the matter for several days, he announced his decision: "No, I will not do it."

This did not satisfy his entreaters, who pressed him to give his reason. At length he replied: "All right, I do not like spinach."

"But what has spinach to do with this?" they asked in dismay.

"Since I have decided not to do it," he replied, "one reason is as good as another."

During their conversations with the Russian scientists, the Americans found that it was necessary to preface every discussion with the statement that it would be carried on within the framework of general and complete disarmament, as the Russians charge that the Americans pay only lip service to total disarmament. Then the Russians would talk freely, and some of them exhibited far more flexibility in outlook than many Americans would think possible for Soviet citizens.

One steady obstacle to communication between Americans and Russians was the lack of a common military vocabulary. In the last few years a relatively small group of Americans has developed a verbal shorthand for new concepts of arms control. Such terms as first strike, second strike and pre-emptive strike represent refined concepts that must be not only translated but explained to the Russians. Many of those who helped in developing these concepts, such as Paul Doty, R. R. Bowie and Henry Kissinger, of Harvard, Amrom Katz, of RAND Corp., and Brennan, were present at the eighth COSWA.

At the center of current American arms control thinking is the concept of stabilized deterrence. In essence, stabilized deterrence is a situation in which each of two sides has enough invulnerable weapons to enable it to inflict heavy damage on the other even if it were attacked first. Stabilized deterrence is not popular with the Russians, although some Americans felt progress was made in persuading them that this is the best way to begin disarmament. The Russians insist that any stabilization occur at a very low level, say one quarter or one-fifth of present armaments, and that, as always, the reduction be carried out as part of general and complete disarmament. The Russians generally held that the reductions should be started with percentage cuts and that somewhere along the line, say after a 50 per cent reduction, the transition be made to evening up the absolute numbers of missiles permitted each side.

Probing the Russians

In their probing of Russian disarmament positions, the Americans were able to establish the general outline of how far the Soviet seemed to be willing to go on controls at this time. (There is no reason to believe that the position of these Russians diverged from the government position since they were in regular telephone contact with Moscow throughout the conference.) The Russians repeatedly offered inspection, beginning with some inspection from the very first and proceeding to total and unrestricted inspection when general and complete disarmament was reached. The Russians made clear that the troika principle did not apply to inspection for general and complete disarmament. However, they also made clear that while they were in favor in principle of a United Nations police force, the troika specifically would be demanded in exercising control over it. In regard to use of the World Court for settlement of disputes, the Russians made it plain that the present composition of the court made this unacceptable.

The Americans generally agreed that it was difficult to tell how much impression their ideas had made on the Russians. Louis B. Sohn, Harvard professor of law, found that his proposal for regional disarmament which had been met coolly when he

tried it out on the Russians last December in Moscow, was received more favorably at Stowe. Under this plan both sides would do the following:

- Divide their territories into a number of regions and submit a complete inventory of all the missile delivery systems in each region.
- Agree on a percentage cut in the number of delivery vehicles, say one-third for a particular phase.
- Submit lists stating in which regions the delivery vehicles, comprising one-third of each country's total, would be destroyed.
- Permit inspections in a certain percentage of the regions, say 10 per cent of them, to determine compliance. The regions to be inspected would be chosen either at random or by the opposite side, and the inspectors would be either neutrals or from the opposite side. (In a rough way, the procedure might be compared to two children dividing a piece of cake. One cuts and the other chooses his piece. Thus each child is assured of not being cheated.)

If the inspections show that both sides are carrying out their agreements, then further reductions may be carried out. During the initial phases both sides retain sufficient retaliatory forces so that if the other side cheats the reduction in arms can be halted before a nation's deterrent forces are jeopardized.

Sohn found that the Russians are evidently not as far advanced in methods of statistical sampling as Americans and that considerable explaining was necessary to demonstrate to them that the limited number of inspections being proposed would make cheating extremely difficult.

The Soviets themselves were reported to have come forward with some new proposals for disengagement in the heart of Europe. Although details were not revealed at the conclusion of the conference, it was understood that the Americans and Russians reached general agreement on proposals centering around creation of a disarmed and denuclearized area in Central Europe. The proposals can be expected to get close attention in Washington, where Secretary of State Rusk has recently referred to the desirability of negotiating not only on Berlin but also on the whole problem of Central Europe. John J. McCloy, President Kennedy's disarmament adviser, recently said: "It is not impossible that the solution of the disarmament problem may become not a condition but a concomitant of the solution of the Berlin and German problem. After all, disarmament is, at least, one field in which we have an apparent common interest with the Soviet Union."

Chinese Iceberg

The question of Communist China in regard to arms control and disarmament was not discussed much openly but like an iceberg it was present in a big way under the surface. COSWA intended to invite several Chinese Communist scientists to attend, following the precedent set when four of them attended the Moscow conference. The State Department okayed the invitations, provided the invitees were *bona fide* scientists, and the Soviet Union was supposed to do the inviting. There the matter ended, along with the inevitable speculation that the Russians had never forwarded the invitations to the Chinese. Conference discussions reinforced the suspicion that the Russians were not particularly eager to have their Chinese comrades present. One American scientist gave this example of Russian concern over growing Red Chinese power:

"The Americans are proposing to the Russians a transitional deterrent force as a means of meeting the clandestine weapon problem.* For example, if we suggest to the Soviets that we both keep 200 missiles, their reply is: 'Yes, but does *everyone* keep 200 missiles?' They are obviously thinking about the Chinese and the Germans."

In regard to Germany, this same American concluded that the Soviet fear of that country was real but that it was based on emotional rather than sound military reasons. He felt that in order for West Germany to become a military threat to the Soviet Union, weapons systems would have to evolve so that West Germany could attack Soviet forces in a way that would preclude retaliation, a development considered unlikely.

The test ban issue hung like a low, dark cloud over the proceedings from beginning to end. There was even doubt as to whether the group could agree on any statement at all to wind up the talks. The Americans wanted an outright condemnation of the Russian resumption of testing; the Russians wanted no mention at all of testing. In the end a two-page statement was agreed upon in which the conference reaffirmed the principles of a 1958 conference statement which included an expression of hope that a test ban and an effective control system would be approved. The 1961 statement also declared: "We hope that the desire for peace and the revulsion against war, which are shared by all peoples, will make possible a peaceful resolution of the conflicts which have led to the present deterioration of the international situation, and make possible the attainment of complete and universal disarmament, and the establishment of stable peace of earth."

Far more important than the concluding statement were the reports of five working groups, which were not released. (Some of them, however, may be released later.) These reports are being made available to the governments involved and to the United Nations. As the conference ended, Harrison Brown, of Caltech, chairman of the American organizing committee of the conference, had this to say of the working group reports:

"Without exception the working groups have turned in constructive reports. The agreements reached in the working groups, all of which contained both Americans and Russians, are considered ahead of anything that has been discussed between governments. Frankly, I had not expected that all five working groups would come up with agreements."

Brown's remarks take on a note of encouragement in view of the broad scope of the working groups. The five groups were:

1. Nuclear production and stockpiles: Cessation of production, and transfer and destruction of nuclear materials.

2. Delivery systems: Problems of elimination and control systems, including missiles and bombers; also problems of outer space control.

3. Selected steps in arms reduction: Interdependence of an international police force, settlement of disputes and arms reduction; nuclear testing; zonal arrangements; the

*The clandestine weapon problem refers to the virtually impossible task of being sure in any disarmament system that all nuclear material and weapons have been found and destroyed. This is both because so much nuclear material has been produced and because some of it could be hidden in ways that would make it nearly impossible to find. Thus, if one side disarmed completely according to the agreement while the other hid some weapons illegally, the honest side could find itself at the mercy of the cheating side.

possible exchange of stabilizing information; problems of disengagement, and problems of military bases.

4. General and complete disarmament: An attempt to discuss the entire question of what a disarmed world would look like if we ever get one; international security forces; ways of settling international disputes; the role of transitional deterrents in reaching general disarmament; the problems of clandestine and overt rearmament, including problems of how to find out about it and how to prevent it, and the organization of control and inspection techniques.

5. Preconditioning to possible success at negotiations and initiation of disarmament measures: International behavior; how to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence, and the role to be played by scientists in creating a world in which negotiations are more likely to succeed.

One specific plan of the working groups was announced at the conference's conclusion. This was the proposal to create two continuing East-West study groups consisting of a few American scientists, a few Russian scientists and a few scientists from other countries who will work together on peace problems on a full-time basis, first for a few months in the United States, then for a few months in the Soviet Union. The groups are to be sponsored jointly by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Science. Although details are yet to be worked out, no serious problems are expected.

The first study group will deal with problems of achieving arms control and disarmament, while the second will consider how a world without arms might function, with special attention to international organization, the World Court and international law. Their discussions will be completely unofficial and informal, but it is hoped they will be helpful to the governments involved in formulating their positions.

Another decision was that COSWA will take a new departure in September, 1962, when it plans to hold a meeting of several hundred participants from many countries of the world in London. The meeting will not be private, as all past conferences have been. Before then, it is possible another of the traditional private meetings will be held, again on disarmament and world security.

Assessing COSWA is not easy, but it seems possible that it may prove to be a social invention of considerable value. The series began in 1954 at Pugwash, Nova Scotia, at the estate of Cleveland industrialist Cyrus Eaton, and for some years the gatherings were known as Pugwash conferences. Now, however, Eaton has nothing to do with the conferences, either financially or otherwise, and the Pugwash name has been dropped in favor of COSWA. Most of the funds for the Stowe meeting came from the Ford Foundation.

COSWA's unusual format no doubt has much to do with its effectiveness. Certainly it is remarkable in today's grim international atmosphere that groups of influential Americans and Russians can have frank discussions of the vital issues separating them.

Relaxed Atmosphere

One reason for this is the relaxed atmosphere in which the conferences are carried on. At Stowe, many of the conferees brought their wives, who were able either to listen in on the conference or loll by the side of the swimming pool. The meager press corps of less than half a dozen was kept at arm's length to preserve the privacy of the conversations. Participants together saw Russian and American movies, rode up the Mt. Mansfield ski lift and went for a boat ride on Lake Champlain. On the final night champagne and Russian vodka were raised in toast after toast at a banquet highlighted by the spontaneous performance of a Cossack dance by Topchiev, the Russian leader.

But the social aspects, while important in relaxing tension, were not the principal reason why the participants were able to engage in free discussion. Most important was the fact that while the conferees were thoroughly familiar with their governments' positions, they were not negotiating them. Thus they could try out new ideas on the other side privately without committing anybody to anything. There was also the opportunity of communicating in person certain attitudes that may not be wholly believed when transmitted through the press or diplomatic channels. For example, the Americans felt they were able to impress on their opposite numbers that the U. S. is deadly serious about preserving a free West Berlin, while the Russians sought to convince the Americans of the genuineness of their fear of Germany.

Following the conference there were different verdicts as to its accomplishments. Chairman Brown said, "The Russians have shown new, hopeful and significant attitudes. New ground was broken in nearly all areas, except nuclear weapons testing which is a dead issue as an isolated subject." Some others felt that scant progress had been made in influencing the thinking of the Russians. However, even the least generous assessment always included the word "useful," and in these times even that is something.

Noel-Baker: 'Discuss the Practical Measures'

Shortly after COSWA concluded, a television broadcast, "Report From Stowe," was made with four American, four Russian and three British participants over WGBH-TV in Cambridge, Massachusetts. All of the speakers agreed that progress had been made toward further international cooperation amongst scientists. (The show, produced by WGBH-TV for the National Educational Television Network, will be shown over various channels throughout the country in coming months.) One of the participants, Philip Noel-Baker, British M.P. and Nobel Peace Prize winner, summed up his impression of the conference this way:

"The conference has strengthened my view that there are no technical problems, even the sighting of missiles and the secret nuclear stock, for which acceptable solutions cannot be found. It strengthened my view that if the arms race goes on, the weapons systems will become much more dangerous still, and therefore disarmament is the best form of national defense. . . .

"I've read every line of the U.N. discussions on disarmament which have taken place since 1945. They are very hard to take. A great part of them consist in the exchange of headline slogans without the discussion of practical details at all. In our conference, competent people have started to discuss the practical measures by which disarmament can be carried through. It is of vast importance that this process should go forward on the unofficial level and by governments too.

EDITORIAL

Would You Rather Be RED Than DEAD?

And how often do you beat your wife? The trouble with both questions is that they are actually statements. One asserts that you beat your wife; the other that the alternatives facing the West are either to submit to communism or to fight a nuclear war. We do not believe it is necessary to be either Red *or* dead.

The Reds can stay Red if they wish, but we insist on remaining free. The trouble is, of course, that the Communists are not so generous. Khrushchev boasts that he will bury us, that our grandchildren will grow up under communism. But in a less belligerent mood, he states that a thermonuclear war would be madness and that if we will accept general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union will accept any controls we devise. He does not threaten to inflict communism on us; he claims it will come in the inevitable course of history. Yet he claims certain "wars of liberation" are just.

Which of these seemingly inconsistent positions shall we believe? Unfortunately, we seem to accept only the aggressive statements of Khrushchev as true, writing off the other statements as propaganda. Odd as it may seem, Khrushchev probably is expressing his real beliefs in all these statements. This becomes apparent through consideration of his two primary motivations: (1) As a dedicated Marxist, he is determined to achieve a Communist world, and (2) As a man able to perceive the facts of nuclear life, he seeks to avoid an all-out war.

Thus, Khrushchev predicts the ultimate victory of communism. He can even encourage small wars and other troubles that are not likely to explode into major war. But, because of the dangers of nuclear war, he cannot try to impose communism by force on the free nations. He has even taken the radical step of changing the Marx-Lenin dogma of inevitable war with capitalist powers to the new dogma of peaceful, or competitive, coexistence. He may even want the general and complete disarmament he talks about so much, although to be convincing he will have to talk in more reasonable terms than he has up to now.

Why, if he really does want to avoid a nuclear war, did he take the highly provocative action of resuming atomic tests? As a Communist, he wanted to inspire awe of Soviet power. He partially succeeded in this, as evidenced by the refusal of the Belgrade neutrals to condemn Soviet test resumption. At the same time, his fear of our nuclear power led him to succumb to the illusion that security can be gained through taking another leap in the arms race. Khrushchev must be made to realize, as we ourselves must realize, that the way out of the arms race is not to be running ahead — for the finish line is just beyond the brink — but to call off the insane contest altogether.

If we wish to be neither Red nor dead, we must deal with Khrushchev's two motives separately, at least in our thinking and planning. His motive as a Communist is clearly opposed to ours, while his desire to avoid nuclear war is identical with ours. Thus we must fight the Communists at the same time that we cooperate with them. We are in a historically novel situation, for in the pre-nuclear era two such camps would simply have a war. Since it is no longer possible for either side to win a war, we must learn to live with these two contradictory motives if we are to live at all.

I. Where We Must Fight the Communists

In balking the Soviet's efforts to dominate the world, we have a free hand in many parts of the world without risking nuclear war. In the free areas of Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia, we can do much to encourage political freedom, economic vitality and social progress. Our policies can even influence certain Communist states more favorably toward us. For instance, our aid to Yugoslavia has helped that country remain outside the Soviet bloc.

As often as it has been said before, the most important task of all is to strengthen our way of life at home. This does *not* mean we should be obsessed by fear of our few home-grown Communists and label every liberal as "soft on communism." It does mean we must defend our political liberty, expand our economy and raise our level of culture. Our most effective weapon against communism is to show the world that freedom produces the happiest life.

II. Where We Must Try to Cooperate With the Communists

We have one overwhelming interest in common with the Communists: preventing war. This does not mean that we should practice appeasement. We must be willing to protect our vital interests with a determination which as a last resort would be backed up by force. But we must guard against letting our anti-communism reach such a pitch that it prevents reasonable settlements. Negotiation is *not* equal to appeasement. We must go into negotiations readily and confidently. On Berlin, in particular, we must do everything possible to reach an honorable agreement soon. A number of possible accommodations based either on Berlin alone or on Central Europe have already been suggested. All of them provide for the continued freedom of West Berlin and guaranteed access to it, and perhaps additional advantages might be won for the West. If we can solve the Berlin problem, other problems to be negotiated in the interest of peace will follow. This is the only road to take if Americans choose to be neither Red nor dead.

The Double Standard of the Belgrade 'Neutrals'—WHY?

By Homer A. Jack

Belgrade, Yugoslavia

The Belgrade Conference of Heads of Non-Aligned States may chiefly be remembered in history for the priority Prime Minister Nehru gave to negotiations for world peace over invectives about colonialism. But the editorial writers and moralists today are still pointing to the double standard shown by these presidents, prime ministers and princes toward Russia's resumption of nuclear tests.

Hours before this historic conference of 25 states (representing almost a third of the world's population) began, Premier Khrushchev announced the resumption of nuclear weapons tests. Presumably Tito and Nkrumah were told in advance. Nehru and Nasser publicly expressed "shock." But by the time the conference drafting committee drew up a paragraph mentioning nuclear tests (which was just before the U. S. also announced its resumption of tests), the shock had worn off sufficiently so that the resultant statement was a pale reflection of what the conference might well have said had the West resumed testing first.

The actual communique stated: "The participants in the conference consider it essential that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view, it is necessary that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and observed by all countries."

Why did the conference not specally castigate the U.S.S.R. for resuming tests as specifically as it condemned the "North American military base" in Cuba? Why was there a differential and deferential treatment of Soviet errors?

To conclude that the conference was "Soviet-leaning" is false. The conference endorsed almost no current Soviet political positions, except the recognition of mainland China and the abolition of colonialism. These goals surely are not the monopoly of the Communist bloc.

The chief reason for the conference's silence on the Russian resumption of tests (and Khrushchev's blustering over Berlin) was a belief, perhaps mistaken, that sharp criticism of Russia in this matter might intensify the Cold War, however much it would please the West. To insure continued economic aid, many of the non-aligned nations want to keep on friendly terms with both Russia and the West. It is probably not entirely true, however, to conclude that the "non-committed" nations were silent because of this economic motive. They were more probably terrified by the show of atomic power made by the Russians and they wanted desperately to help lessen the Cold War, not intensify it.

The legacy of colonialism and racism left to the Asian and African nations is deep. Thus when their former colonial masters do something they consider wrong, they denounce them mightily to accentuate the chronic immorality of the ex-colonial powers. Many expect the West to be wrong and they are eager to denounce this wrong-doing.

But on a deeper level there is an ambivalence toward the West. Some Asians and Africans hate the West, but their leaders are at least half Western in outlook and preference, and, in a sense, they also love the West. Thus reaction to Western misdeeds is one of sorrow as much as one of hate. Knowing the West, they like the West, and despite its many misdeeds expect much from the West. They do not know Russia and their expectations of communism vary. This differential reaction could be a compliment to the West if only the Cold War implications were not so serious.

Dr. Jack was an official observer at the Belgrade Conference for the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, of which he is executive director.

Also there are tactical considerations behind the double standard. Some of the non-aligned states sharply and publicly criticize Western political behavior because they know that responsible criticisms influence Western public opinion which, in turn, has an influence on government policy. But they know that there is relatively little effective public opinion in Communist lands. Thus if they want to influence government policy in Russia there is less point to public criticism. So they save — they say — their criticism for the confines of the Kremlin or for normal diplomatic channels. Tied to this is an evaluation of the present power struggle inside the Soviet Communist Party. They feel that Mr. Khruschchev, for all his faults, is the best possible leader obtainable at the moment inside Russia, and that there are forces constantly trying to push him aside. Therefore the non-aligned leaders do not want to do anything to help the anti-Khrushchev forces come to the fore inside the Kremlin.

A Softer Line

Whatever the explanation, there was a softer line toward Moscow than toward Washington on the test ban issue. This does not give any moral supremacy to the U. S. or the U.S.S.R. or both, but it does prove that the morals of the non-aligned states themselves are hardly pristine; rather they are conditioned by quite human factors.

Having said this, one must affirm that the conference regained its discrimination in producing good resolutions on disarmament. These urged: (1) a "radical solution" for the disarmament problem based on "general, complete and strictly internationally controlled disarmament," (2) representation of the non-aligned nations at further disarmament negotiations, and (3) convening of a special U. N. General Assembly session on disarmament or a world disarmament conference under U. N. auspices.

ON THE PEACE FRONT

By Jack Voelpel

Psychologists for Peace

Every day new groups are concerning themselves with the problems of peace. Latest to be organized in the U. S. is Psychologists for Peace.

Still in the process of formation, the new organization was launched this summer by a group of New York psychologists who hope that eventually it will become international in scope.

In their organizing statement, the founders said: "On all continents psychology is being employed skillfully to divide the peoples of the world; the time is overdue for us to apply constructively our understanding of human relations. . . . As psychologists there is much that we can do to bring our professional skills to bear on some of the inter-group tensions."

Its tentative program of activities includes: (1) recruiting psychologists around the world to collaborate on the planning of applied social, educational and clinical projects for underdeveloped countries; (2) arranging international conferences and special activities with behavioral scientists as well as with political leaders on problems contributing to world tensions; (3) fostering international exchange fellowships in psychology. The group hopes to have a "Round-the-World Flight for Peace" sometime in the summer of 1962 or 1963 for the purpose of meeting with fellow psychologists and political leaders abroad.

Why another organization? As the founders indicated in their organizing statement: "The world can no longer rely on an outmoded philosophy of peace through strength now that weapons have become destructive enough to threaten the annihilation of mankind. World leaders and their people must be encouraged to seek resolution of international issues by peaceful methods. Psychologists have a unique opportunity to use their specialty creatively toward this goal. . . ."

For further information about the group, contact Dr. Stanley Zuckerman, 104-40 Queens Blvd., Forest Hills 75, New York.

Peace on the Airwaves

The World Peace Broadcasting Foundation is the name of a rather new and unique service group. It was organized in February, 1960, to gather tape recordings of talks by outstanding leaders on world peace and the nuclear arms race for distribution to radio stations and to religious and civic club meetings. It also prints selected speeches.

The president of the foundation (3005 High Street, Des Moines 12, Iowa) is William N. Plymat, head of the Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company. The board of directors includes TV personality Steve Allen.

Supported by donations, the organization provides tape recordings on a free basis to radio stations, supplies one free printed copy of various radio talks to radio listeners and sells tape recordings and printed copies of talks in quantity to civic and other groups. Available tapes feature talks by psychiatrist Jerome Frank on "The Nuclear Arms Race," Dr. Martin Luther King on "Facing the Challenge of the New Age," Steve Allen on "Morality and Nuclear War," W. H. Ferry on "The Case for Unilateral Disarmament," and Earl Clement Attlee, among others. Some of these are printed. A tape and printed texts are also available of a recent speech on "War and Peace and the Berlin Crisis," by Fred Warner Neal, professor of international relations at the Claremont (Calif.) Graduate School. For a complete list of the tapes and printed speeches available and changes, write directly to the foundation.

Suggested Peace ACTION for the Month

Want to invest ten minutes of your life to try to advance world peace? A new questionnaire, "TEN MINUTES FOR PEACE — A PERSONAL AUDIT," has just been prepared by the Institute for International Order (11 West 42d Street, New York, N. Y.) to help citizens become more aware of their attitudes, their thinking, their knowledge about permanent world peace. Send for free copy now and have free copies sent to your friends.

Plotting Against War

A "Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace" is being held October 19-22 at AIRLEE, a new conference center near Warrenton, Virginia, about 40 miles from Washington.

This will be the third in a series of meetings within the past 16 months — the first was in June, 1960, the second in January, 1961, both at Arden House, Columbia University's conference center at Harriman, New York.

Initiated by oilman Tom Slick, the conferences bring together some 100-115 leaders from business, the professions and the academic world to explore ways of achieving a more stable world situation with regard to both short and long range goals. The forthcoming meeting hopes to go beyond the interchange of ideas and come up with suggested recommendations on a "Strategy for Peace."

The third conference, co-hosted by Mr. Slick, C. Maxwell Stanley and Mrs. Albert D. Lasker, will have as guests a number of governmental officials. Background papers being prepared for the participants include a review of the world situation, analysis of U. S. proposals at the United Nations and the current picture concerning arms control.

The final report of the January, 1961, meeting is currently available free of charge from the conference's headquarters: 510 Madison Avenue, Room 701, New York 21, N. Y.

(This conference will be the first "in-residence" meeting to be held at newly-opened AIRLEE. Operated by the Airlie Foundation, the center is offered for use to groups as an educational and research conference meeting place in order to provide a forum for the discussion of the problems within our society, and to encourage the exchange of ideas.)

A.A.U.N. Plans Campaign

The American Association for the United Nations has under way a nationwide campaign to bring discussion of some of the major issues before the current 16th U.N. General Assembly into every American home, church, school and public meeting.

Working through its own state and local adult chapters and some 275 chapters of the Collegiate Council for the United Nations, totaling about 65,000 members, the A.A.U.N. has also asked some 100 national organizations to cooperate in this

educational campaign so that "the American public may assist its government in making the maximum contribution to meeting these problems in the 16th General Assembly."

A special kit containing fact sheets on the major issues before the U.N. covers such subjects as reorganization of the Secretariat, Berlin, the critical problem of U.N. expenses, particularly in the Congo, the problem of Chinese representation, disarmament, the economic and political security of the new states of Asia and Africa, the peaceful uses of outer space and expanded technical assistance. Copies of the kit, with a special introduction on what the individual can do locally, are available for 50¢ each from the A.A.U.N., 345 East 46th St., N. Y. 17, N. Y. One suggestion: The A.A.U.N. believes that the papers could be used as the basis for discussion programs on radio and TV in local communities.

SANE to Gather

The fourth national conference of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (17 East 45th Street, New York 17, N. Y.) will be held in New York, October 12-15. Theme of the annual meeting will be "Sanity and Survival." Some 125-150 delegates from SANE chapters throughout the country are expected to attend. They will discuss the future of the organization, policy and ways and means of dealing with current issues.

The program for the conference will include a seminar on October 13 on "Disarmament and the United Nations," which will be attended by representatives of the U.N. delegations of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

For a New 'Central Thrust'

"Turn Toward Peace" is the slogan of a new national campaign initiated by peace, church, labor and public affairs leaders "to develop alternatives to the threat of war as the central thrust of American foreign policy."

Launched in September and initially planned as a three-month operation for the fall of 1961, the campaign resulted from a recommendation by the Consultative Peace Council, a group of organizations — mostly pacifist — concerned with peace education and action. At a meeting in July, the council, concerned about the crisis facing mankind, felt that the various peace groups should play a larger role in developing alternatives to war.

Endorsed by the Continuations Committee of the 43 groups which sponsored the disarmament conference in Washington last April, the campaign officially got under way in September at a meeting of non-governmental organization leaders to define the scope of the campaign. It was decided that the campaign would focus on five issues: Berlin, nuclear weapons and inspected disarmament, the China question, defining and strengthening the U.N., and the new disarmament agency.

It is hoped to carry the campaign into the 16 largest Metropolitan centers and some 400 communities throughout the U. S. The effort allows a wide variety of organizations to relate to it in the detail of local programs and organization plans.

In addition to the state and community work, the group will also launch a major media campaign to get these issues discussed before the public.

Further information is available from Robert Pickus, campaign coordinator, in care of the American Friends Service Committee, 218 East 18th St., N. Y., N. Y.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

On Soviet CD

To the Editor:

I would like to add to your very interesting editorial on "Should You Build a Fallout Shelter?" some further information on Soviet civil defense preparation which appeared in the *New York Times* just about the time the last issue of *War/Peace Report* went to press.

You quoted Osgood Caruthers' article in the *Times* reporting ". . . no outward signs of even the most elementary preparations for civil defense against nuclear blast or fallout" in the Soviet Union. A report by Theodore Shabad under a Moscow dateline of August 25th stated: "There is a controversy among foreign experts here as to the precise extent of Soviet civil defense measures. Information is hard to come by."

On the other hand, Shabad goes on to report:

"The Soviet Union has a large civil defense organization known as the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Air Force and Navy. This organization trains its reported 22,000,000 members not only in anti-aircraft measures but in such paramilitary sports as skiing, swimming, shooting and parachute jumping. A wide range of training manuals and other literature published prepares members for nuclear, chemical and biological warfare.

"Earlier this year the civil defense body issued a manual for 'training the adult population in measures to liquidate the consequences of an air attack.' The 160-page booklet was printed in an edition of 200,000 copies.

"The manual is designed to aid instructors in organizing civil defense units, which may include men aged 16 to 60 and women up to the age of 55. The manual's step-by-step instructions cover air raids, firefighting, first aid and defense against chemical, radioactive and bacteriological attack.

"Another pamphlet titled 'Be Ready for Anti-Aircraft Defense' is addressed to children. It instructs youngsters in the organization of civil defense units in schools and in measures ranging from air-raid drills to the use of gas masks and shelters."

Shabad concludes by saying that, "These and other publications issued by the civil defense body's own publishing house in hundreds of thousands of copies would seem to leave no doubt that civil defense in the Soviet Union is a serious business despite the lack of publicity."

RICHARD C. ROWSON
New York, N. Y.

Too Little, Too Late?

To the Editor:

You are doing an outstanding job with *War/Peace Report*. But I think it's too late for reasonable argument; the bullies and pharisees are in charge everywhere.

W. H. FERRY
Santa Barbara, Calif.

Ask the People!

By George Holt

Recently William B. Widnall, Republican Congressman from the 7th District of New Jersey, sent out a poll to his constituents. He mailed 60,000 questionnaires and received 12,000 replies. This makes a good cross-section, therefore, of a district, one which is probably pretty typical.

He asked his people whether they regarded the United Nations as the best hope to maintain world peace. Eighty-four per cent thought it was, 14 per cent disagreed, two per cent had no opinion.

Almost 80 per cent thought the United Nations has been effective in maintaining better understanding between nations.

Over 72 per cent considered general and complete disarmament one of the primary objectives of American foreign policy.

He then asked: "As a means of assuring 'effective international control' of any disarmament agreement would you favor the creation of rules of law backed by a world court and enforced by a legally controlled international armed force?" Yes, said 77½ per cent; No, said 8.75 per cent; 13.75 had no opinion.

Eighty-one per cent believed the United Natios should be strengthened.

On the question of whether the United Nations should be strengthened into a federal form of world government similar to the United States in order to enforce disarmament and settle international disputes, the yes answers were an astonishing 76.58 per cent, as against a mere 8.75 per cent of no's, with 14.67 per cent having no opinion.

The congressman lastly asked his constituents whether the United States should "take the lead in proposing measures of this nature in the face of the present attitude of the Soviet Union," and almost 73 per cent said yes as against 12 per cent opposed.

These are American citizens speaking. They are not experts in the science of government or federalism or law. They do not know all the answers about the United Nations. But they were asked specific questions and they gave overwhelming answers.

Our State Department under three administrations has refused to back the development of the United Nations into an effective law enforcing, federal agency. The excuse, if you can dignify it with that title, has been that there is no indication that the people want such a thing, or that it would not be timely to take such action now.

The State Department people should go out and ask the American people, as Congressman Widnall has done. They might learn something. They might learn, for instance, that the political maturity of the people back home is, in some very basic areas of thought, considerably ahead of the maturity of the State Department. Perhaps this is information the department would not like to get.

No one likes to prove that he has been stupid, timid and arrogant — no one, especially bureaucrats.

But right now our bureaucrats are trying to cope with a world crisis which simply cannot be coped with under the old rules and with the old tools. They are failing, and exposing the nation they are paid to protect to the most terrible consequences.

They had better ask the people. For the people know better than they.

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In the September/October issue of SURVIVAL:

DISARMAMENT and ARMS CONTROL — Report and Speeches (Rt. Hon. David Ormsby-Gore, M. Jules Moch and Senator Hubert Humphrey) from **European American Assembly.**

DEFENSE, DISARMAMENT and the CHRISTIAN DECISIONS — Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard.

REGION-BY-REGION DISARMAMENT — Physicist David R. Inglis.

CAN AMERICA FIGHT A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR? — Colonel T. Dupuy.

WHAT IS LOCAL WAR? — Colonel V. Glazov.

THE VALUE OF NUMBERS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE —

I A German View — General Pickert

II A Soviet View — Colonel A. M. Iovlev

PRESIDENT KENNEDY and Mr. KHRUSHCHEV: ACTION and REACTION
CORRESPONDENCE from Professor Robert Strausz-Hupe and Professor Max Beloff

BOOK REVIEWS of **"Men in Uniform,"** by M.R.D. Foot; **"L'Avenir de L'Alliance Atlantique,"** by Claud Delmas, General Carpentier, General Gallois and Maurice Faure; **"Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security,"** edited by Donald G. Brennan, and **"Christians and Power Politics,"** by Alan Booth.

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LISTENING POST

By Richard C. Rowson

In the "Voice of Dissent" section of the "new look" *Saturday Evening Post,* (September 16), Herman Kahn, author of "On Thermonuclear War," claims we're too scared to think about and prepare for the very real possibility, as he puts it, of thermonuclear war. States Kahn: "One dangerous and destructive but quite conceivable way in which world order could be brought about in the immediate future — perhaps tomorrow — would be for some buttons to be pushed by accident, thereby setting off nuclear weapons in the U. S. or Russia. . . . After that, can you imagine the people of the world returning to the old system of 'peace keeping?' Everybody would be fed up with deterrence and international anarchy."

Kahn goes on to claim that "having adequate shelters might make the difference in saving 50,000,000 American lives." The September 15th issue of *Life,* which also urges fallout shelters, claims that "you could be among the 97 per cent to survive if you follow the advice on these pages." It is regrettable that someone in a position to know has not clarified the contradiction between *Life's* figures and the testimony of civil defense officials before Congressional committees, which gives a much more somber picture of the chances for survival in the eventuality of nuclear attack. Even more regrettable is the lack of attention given by our mass media to a "plan for possible alternatives to peace keeping" called for by Mr. Kahn.

New Soviet Pamphlets

Three pamphlets just received from Crosscurrents Press, 156 Fifth Ave., New York 10, N. Y., issued, according to the publisher's note, "in response to the growing demand for information and source material on Soviet developments," are titled: (1) "Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," made public this past August, (2) "A Peace Treaty With Germany: Three Speeches by N. S. Khrushchev," and (3) "Three Documents of Current History," including a report by Mr. K. on his Vienna meeting with President Kennedy and two memoranda on nuclear tests and a German peace treaty.

Everything points to the increased prominence of Communist China on the world scene and to new approaches to the problem of China's seat in the U. N. during the current meeting of the General Assembly. This question is discussed in a new pamphlet, "Focus on China," issued by the Institute for World Affairs Education of the University of Wisconsin. The pamphlet is comprised of conference speeches held at the Institute last March. One set of viewpoints is presented by Walter S. Robertson, former assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs; David Rowe, of Yale University, and C. H. Lowe, counselor, Embassy of the Republic of China. A different set of views is presented by Dr. H. Arthur Steiner, of U.C.L.A., Richard Davy, of the *London Times,* and Eduard Vostrel, of the Yugoslav consulate.

The important issue of U. S. foreign trade policy has been very ably analyzed by Senator Jacob Javits in an important speech in the Senate on June 27, 1961, reprinted for public distribution by the senator. Javits calls for the immediate development of U. S. policies suited to the new problems we face and urges a public "great debate" before the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act expires next year.

APATHETIC?

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